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1 Introduction
Despite of the substantial progress made in activity-based demand modeling and computa-
tional simulation techniques, most dynamic traffic assignment (DTA) models still suffer from
overly simplified behavioral representations. There are two major issues:
1. Consistently incorporated choice dimensions rarely go beyond route choice.
2. Decision protocols rarely go beyond stochastic equilbrium models.
Most DTA models take time-dependent origin/destination (OD) matrices as inputs and equi-
librate time-dependent route flows [Peeta and Ziliaskopoulos, 2001]. Yet, they ignore the
feedback of changing network conditions on higher–level choice dimensions such as departure
time choice, mode choice, activity schedule choice, and such. It appears natural to extend the
feedback to all choice dimensions, which also requires to consistently account for them at the
assignment level.
One essential aspect of introducing more behavior into DTA models is to account for the
dynamic constraints subject to which real travelers make their decisions: For example, going
somewhere by car is likely to imply that later travel is done by car as well, or going shopping
during a lunch break renders later shopping trips unnecessary. However, as long as the demand
representation is in terms of temporally at most loosely coupled OD matrices, it discards much
of the structure of real travel decisions.
Having said this, the question arises how to implement and simulate a demand model that
properly accounts for general choice dimensions and constraints. A specification in terms
of analytical equations exhibits desirable formal properties and enables the application of
sound mathematical solution procedures [see, e.g., the supernetworks approach in Sheffi, 1985,
Nagurney and Dong, 2002]. However, if the structure of the behavioral model is to be properly
accounted for, the dimension of the problem to be solved increases vastly. Mathematically,
this can be accounted for by increasing the number of commodities in the macroscopic model,
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which accounts for the likelwise increased degree of heterogeneity in the population that is
naturally revealed if the demand model becomes more detailed. However, because of the
combinatorial nature of all possible choices a traveler faces during a single day, the number
of commodities quickly becomes computationally intractable.
At this point, microsimulation naturally enters the picture. Observing that the solution of a
DTA model that comprises a large number of commodities is in fact a choice distribution over
all of these commodities, rather than a vector of deterministic expectation values, Monte Carlo
techniques for the realization of this distribution come to mind. Assuming without loss of
generality the most disaggregate case where every single traveler constitutes one commodity,
the micro-simulation of individual travel behavior can be re-interpreted as a Monte Carlo
technique to draw from the underlying distributions. That is, while the microsimulation
of individual behavior has an intuitive meaning, it maintains a mathematically consistent
interpretation.
The transition from multi-commodity flows to microsimulation faces a symmetrical develop-
ment in the field of random utility modeling: The classical multinomial logit model allows
to estimate different coefficients for different segments of the population of decision makers,
but the granularity of this segmentation is limited [Ben-Akiva and Lerman, 1985]. Random
coefficient models overcome this confinement in that they allow for a whole distribution of
behavioral parameters. However, since random coeffient models have difficult mathematical
forms, their evaluation and estimation is conducted based on Monte Carlo simulation [Train,
2003].
Even the micro-simulation approach comes with a substantial computational burden. The
simulation of millions of individual travelers on a detailed network requires a careful balance
between modeling precision and computational efficiency, and it requires to incorporate sub-
stantial computer science and software design knowledge in order to implement operational
simulation systems. By now, most of the computational problems can be considered to be
solved at least at a basic level of modeling sophistication even for large-scale scenarios, and
the most critical research question has become to move these solutions into a more consistent
modeling framework while maintaining their favorable computational properties.
This paper starts in Sec. 2 with a discussion of how the iterative solution procedure of con-
gested assignment models can be re-interpreted as a behavioral learning loop. This includes, as
important elements, the move from continuous traffic streams to discrete individual travellers,
and the inclusion of additional choice dimensions beyond route choice.
Sec. 3 then concentrates on how these concepts can be implemented in a microscopic, behaviorally-
oriented (“agent-based”) simulation. Most of the text concentrates on what we call agent-based
stochastic user equilibrium (SUE); here, the SUE formulation is traced back to its origins in
that the simulated travelers are assumed to have a choice set consisting of several alternatives,
and that, in every iteration, they make a deliberate, probabilistic choice from this set. It is
noted that this has useful parallels with co-evolutionary computation, and in consequence
algorithms and methods from that area can be used to address the agent-based SUE problem.
A regular challenge with agent-based simulations is how to set the microscopic rules such that
the macroscopic outcome (sometimes called “emergence”) corresponds to known or desired
behavior. Sec. 4 demonstrates how this challenge can be addressed in the area of behavioral
traffic simulation.
All developments in this paper assume within-day dynamic behavior, i.e. a development of
the traffic and behavioral patterns along the time-of-day axis. The typical equilibrium inter-
pretation will, however, assume that there is no within-day replanning. Since this is clearly an
important behavioral dimension, Sec. 5 will investigate some of its consequences. The paper
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finishes with a conclusion in Sec. 6.
2 Equilibrium models and day-to-day replanning
The traffic assignment problem, no matter if macroscopic or microscopic, static or dynamic,
trip-based or agent-based, is to identify a situation in which travel demand and travel supply
(network conditions) are consistent with each other. The travel demand results from a demand
model that reacts to the conditions in the network, and the network conditions are the output
of a supply model (network loading model) that takes travel demand as its input. That is,
a solution of the traffic assignment problem describes an equilibrium between travel demand
and travel supply.
The arguably most intuitive mathematical formulation of this problem is in terms of a fixed
point: Find a demand pattern that generates network conditions that in turn cause the
same demand pattern to re-appear. This formulation is operationally important because it
motivates a straightforward way of calculating an equilbrium by alternately evaluating the
demand model and the supply model. If these iterations stabilize then a fixed point is attained
that solves the traffic assignment problem.
In the following, an increasingly comprehensive specification of the traffic assignment problem
is given that starts from the classical static user equilibrium model and ends with a fully
dynamic model that captures arbitrary travel demand dimensions at the individual level.
Computationally, the iterative fixed point solution procedure is carried throughout the entire
development. Not by chance, this solution method also has a behavioral interpretation as a
model of day-to-day replanning.
We start by considering route assignment only. The generalization towards further choice
dimensions will turn to be a natural generalization of the route assignment problem.
2.1 Static traffic assignment
Consider a network of nodes and links, where some or all of the nodes are demand origins,
denoted by o, and/or demand destinations, denoted by d. The constant demand qod in
origin/destination (OD) relation od splits up among a set of routes Kod. Denote the flow on
route k ∈ Kod by rodk , where
∑
k∈Kod rodk = q
od.
Most route assignment models either specify a User (Nash, Wardrop) equilibrium (UE) or
a stochastic user equilbrium (SUE). A UE postulates that rodk is zero for every route k of
non-minimal cost [Wardrop, 1952]:
c(k) = min
s∈Kod
c(s) ⇒ rodk ≥ 0 (1)
c(k) > min
s∈Kod
c(s) ⇒ rodk = 0 (2)
where c(k) is the cost (typically delay) on route k.
An alternative, often-used approach is to distribute the demand onto the routes such that a
SUE is achieved where users have different perceptions of route cost and every user takes the
route of perceived minimal cost [Daganzo and Sheffi, 1977]. Mathematically, this means that
the route flows fulfill some distribution
rodk = P
od
k (c(x({rodk }))) · qod (3)
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where the route splits P odk are a function of the network costs c(x), which depend on the
network conditions x, which in turn depend on all route flows {rodk }.
In either case, the model needs to be solved iteratively, which typically involves the following
steps [Sheffi, 1985]:
Algorithm 1 Macroscopic and static route assignment
1. Initial conditions: Compute some initial routes (e.g., best path on empty network for
every OD pair).
2. Iterations: Repeat the following many times.
(a) Network loading: Load the demand on the network along its routes and obtain
network delays (congestion).
(b) Choice set generation: Compute new routes based on the network delays.
(c) Choice: Distribute the demand between the routes based on the network delays.
Considering the network loading to be more on the “physical” side of the system, the behav-
iorally relevant steps are choice set generation and choice [Bowman and Ben-Akiva, 1998].
Choice set generation: Often, the new routes are best paths based on the last iteration
(“best reply” choice set generation). The routes are generated within the iterations because
an a priori enumeration of all possible routes is computationally infeasible.
Choice: Usually, demand is shifted among the routes in a way that improves consistency with
the route choice model, assuming in the simplest case constant network delays: In a UE, the
flow on the currently best routes is increased at the cost of the other route flows (“best reply”
choice), whereas for a SUE the flows are shifted towards the desired route choice distribution
[often a version of multinomial logit, e.g., Dial, 1971, Cascetta et al., 1996, Ben-Akiva and
Bierlaire, 1999]. For stability reasons, this shift is typically realized in some gradual way that
dampens the dynamics of the iterations. See below for more discussion on convergence issues.
The iterations are repeated until some stopping criterion is fulfilled that indicates that a fixed
point is attained. In the best reply situation, the fixed point implies that no shift between
routes takes place, i.e., what comes out as the best reply to the previous iteration is either the
same or at least of the same performance as what was used in the previous iteration. Since in
this situation no OD pair can unilaterally improve by switching routes, this means that the
system is at a Nash equilbrium [e.g., Hofbauer and Sigmund, 1998]. In the SUE situation, the
fixed point means that a route flow pattern {rodk } is found that leads to exactly those network
conditions the travelers perceived when choosing their routes, giving nobody an incentive to
re-route.
Behavioral dimensions beyond route choice that can be captured by a static model are des-
tination choice and elasticity in the demand. However, no technical generality is lost when
discussing only route choice because both additional choice dimensions can be rephrased as
generalized routing problems on an extended network [“supernetwork”; see, e.g., Sheffi, 1985,
Nagurney and Dong, 2002].
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2.2 Dynamic traffic assignment
As is well known, the above also works for dynamic traffic assignment [DTA; see Peeta and
Ziliaskopoulos, 2001], where both the demand and the network conditions are now time-
dependent and the time-dependent travel times in the network now define a physically mean-
ingful progression of a demand unit through the network.
The structure of the algorithm does not change. The individual steps now look as follows:
Algorithm 2 Macroscopic and dynamic route assignment
1. Initial conditions: Compute some initial routing (e.g., best path on empty network
for every OD pair and departure time).
2. Iterations: Repeat the following many times.
(a) Network loading: Load all demand items on the network according to their de-
parture times, let them follow their routes, and obtain network delays (congestion).
(b) Choice set generation: Compute new routes based on the network delays.
(c) Choice: Distribute the demand between the routes based on the network delays.
Once more, if the new routes are best replies (i.e., best paths based on the last iteration), if
demand is shifted towards these new routes, and if these iterations reach a fixed point, then
this is a dynamic UE since the best reply dynamics means that no traveler can unilaterally
deviate to a better route. The SUE interpretation carries over in a similar way.
Destination choice and elasticity in the demand apply naturally to the dynamic case as well.
Beyond this, the dynamic setting also enables the modeling of departure time choice. Again,
the sole consideration of route choice does at least technically not constitute a limitation
because departure time choice can be translated into route choice in a time-expanded version
of the original network [van der Zijpp and Lindveld, 2001].
2.3 Individual travelers
Both in the static and in the dynamic case, it is possible to re-interpret the algorithm in
terms of individual travelers. In the static case, for every OD pair one needs to assume a
steady (= constant) flow of travelers that enter the network at the origin at a constant rate,
corresponding to that OD flow. A solution to the static assignment problem corresponds to
the distribution of the different travelers onto possibly different paths. In the dynamic case,
one needs to generate the appropriate number of travelers for every OD pair and every time
slot, and distribute them across the time slot. From then on, the triple (origin, destination,
departure time) is fixed for every simulated traveler, and its goal is to find an appropriate
path. Arguably, in the dynamic case this re-interpretation is behaviorally more plausible.
In a trip-based context, there are two major motivations to go from continuous flows to
individual travelers:
• Traffic flow dynamics in complex network infrastructures are difficult to model in terms
of continous flows but are relatively straightforward to simulate at the level of individ-
ual vehicles [TSS Transport Simulation Systems, accessed 2009, MITSIM, Quadstone
Paramics Ltd., accessed 2009, PTV AG, accessed 2009]. Disaggregating an OD ma-
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trix into individual trip-makers allows to assign one vehicle to every trip-maker in the
microscopic traffic flow simulation.
• As mentioned in the introduction, it is computationally inefficient to capture demand
heterogeneity through a large number of commodity flows, whereas the sampling of
trip-makers with different characteristics is fairly straightforward. For example, every
vehicle can be given an individual route to its individual destination.
For a finite population of heterogenous travelers, every single traveler constitutes an integer
commodity, and the choice step hence needs to be changed from ”gradually shift the route
flows towards something that is consistent with the behavioral model” into ”for a fraction of
travelers, assign a single behaviorally plausible route to each of these travelers”. The gradual
shift that helps to stabilize the iterations in the continuous assignment carries over here to an
equally stabilizing ”inert shift” in that not all travelers change their routes at once. This is a
consistent reformulation: If one reduces the traveler size to ε→ 0 and increases the number of
travelers by a factor of 1/ε, a 10% chance of changing routes in the disaggregate case carries
over to shifting 10% of all flows to new routes in the aggregate case (“continuous limit”).
Apart from this, the iterations do not look much different from what has been said before:
Algorithm 3 Microscopic and dynamic route assignment
1. Initial conditions: Compute some initial routing (e.g., best path on empty network
for every traveler).
2. Iterations: Repeat the following many times.
(a) Network loading: Load all travelers on the network according to their departure
times, let them follow their routes, and obtain network delays (congestion).
(b) Choice set generation: Compute new routes based on the network delays.
(c) Choice: Assign every traveler to a route (which can be the previously chosen one)
based on the network delays.
The notions of UE and SUE carry over to the disaggregate case if the notion of an OD pair
(or a commodity) is replaced by that of an individual particle (= microscopic traveler).
A particle UE may be defined as a system state where no particle can unilaterally improve
itself. This definition is consistent with definitions in game theory, which normally start from
the discrete problem. It should be noted, however, that this makes the problem combinatorial,
which means that even a problem that had a unique solution in its continuous version may
have a large number of solutions in its discrete version. That is, the particle UE is deliberately
not searching for, say, an integer approximation of the continuous solution. This is structurally
similar to the situation that linear programming jumps to being NP-hard when the variables
are required to be integers.
As is well known, there may be situations where mixed strategy equilibria exist; these are
equilibria where the participants draw between different fixed strategies randomly. This im-
plies that the opponents need to interpret the outcome of the game probabilistically: Even if
they themselves play fixed strategies, they need to maximize some expectation value.
For a particle SUE, the continuous limit assumption of the macroscopic model is discarded
in that the choice fractions P odk (c(x({rodk }))) in (3) are now interpreted as individual-level
choice probabilities. This implies that the route flows rodk are now integer random variables,
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and consequently the cost structure based on which the individual choices are made becomes
probabilistic as well [Balijepalli et al., 2007, Cascetta and Cantarella, 1991, Cascetta, 1989].
A particle SUE is defined as a system state where travelers draw routes from a stationary
choice distribution such that the resulting distribution of traffic conditions re-generates that
choice distribution.
An operational specification of a particle SUE results if one assumes that travelers filter out
the random fluctuations in what they observe and base their decisions only on the average
route costs:
Pn(k) = Pn
(
k|E{c(x({rodk }))}
)
(4)
where Pn(k) now is the probability that trip-maker n selects route k and E{·} denotes the
expectation.
The resulting route flows rodk represent not only the mean network conditions but also their
variability due to the individual-level route sampling. Alternatively, one could use the particles
merely as a discretization scheme of continuous OD flows and distribute them as closely as
possible to the macroscopic average flow rates [e.g., Zhang et al., 2008]. The latter approach,
however, does not lend itself to the subsequently developed behavioral model type.
No new behavioral dimensions are added when going from commodity flows to particles.
However, the microscopic approach allows to simulate greater behavioral variability within
the given choice dimensions because it circumvents the computational difficulties of tracking
a large number of commodity flows.
2.4 Stochastic network loading
The network loading can be deterministic or stochastic. With deterministic network loading,
given time-dependent route inflows, one obtains one corresponding vector of network costs.
With stochastic network loading, given the same input, one obtains a distribution of vectors
of network costs.
The macroscopic SUE approach of Section 2.1 assumes a distribution of choices but converts
choice probabilities into choice fractions before starting the network loading. That is, one
effectively does NetworkLoading(E{Choices}). It is, however, by no means clear that this is
the same as E{NetworkLoading(Choices)}; in fact, with a non-linear network loading, even
when it is deterministic, the two are different [Cascetta, 1989]. Any Monte Carlo simulation
of the particle SUE makes this problem explicit: If, at the choice level, one generates draws
from the choice distribution, it effectively makes sense to first perform the network loading
and then do the averaging, rather than the other way around. This is especially true if day-
to-day replanning is modeled where the draws from the choice distribution have a behavioral
interpretation as the actual choices of the trip makers in a given day.
This, however, makes the output from the network loading effectively stochastic since the input
to the network loading is stochastic. In consequence, any behavioral model that uses the traffic
conditions as input needs to deal with the issue that these inputs are stochastic. For that
reason, using a stochastic instead of a deterministic network loading makes little additional
difference. Being able to make the network loading stochastic makes the implementation of
certain network loading models simpler. In particular, randomness is a method to resolve
fractional behavior in a model with discrete particles.
With stochastic network loading, additional aspects of the iterative dynamics need to be
defined. For example, a “best reply” could be against the last stochastic realization or against
some average.
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2.5 Extending the route assignment loop to other choice dimensions
Given the above behavioral interpretation, it is now straightforward to extend the assignment
loop to other choice dimensions. For example, the “best reply” can include optimal departure
times [e.g. de Palma and Marchal, 2002, Ettema et al., 2003] or optimal mode choice. This
becomes easiest to interpret (and, in our view, most powerful in practice) if one moves from
the concept of “trips” to daily plans.
One way to denote daily plans is using an XML notation [XML]:
<plan >
<activity type="home" location="123" endtime="07:23:45" ... />
<activity type="work" location="..." endtime="..." ... />
<activity type="shop" ... />
...
</plan >
This implies that the structure of the DTA in terms of the triple (origin, departure time,
destination) is maintained. But different from the DTA, all activities are chained together.
This widens the behavioral modeling scope dramatically in that all choice dimensions of a daily
travel plan can now be jointly equilibrated. This increases the number of degrees of freedom
that need to be modeled, but it also brings a set of natural constraints along, which again
reduce the solution space. Most noteably, the destination of one trip must be the origin of
the subsequent trip of an individual, and a traveler must arrive before she/he departs. Also,
constraints such as Ha¨gerstrand’s space-time prisms [Ha¨gerstrand, 1970] are automatically
enforced when the simulated travelers eventually need to return to their starting locations.
There is not much of a conceptual difference between the network loading of a route-based
and a plan-based model.
The notion of a particle (S)UE can now be naturally extended to synthetic travelers (agents)
that execute complete plans.
An agent-based UE implies individual travelers (Sec. 2.3), additional choice dimensions
(Sec. 2.5), and possibly stochastic network loading (Sec. 2.4). Corresponding to the particle
UE, it is defined as a system state where no agent can unilaterally improve its plan.
An agent-based SUE implies individual travelers (Sec. 2.3), additional choice dimensions
(Sec. 2.5), and normally stochastic network loading (Sec. 2.4). Corresponding to the particle
SUE, it is defined as a system state where agents draw from a stationary choice distribution
such that the resulting distribution of traffic conditions re-generates that choice distribution.
If the iterations aim at an agent-based UE, then choice set generation and choice should
implement a “best reply” logic in that in some sense optimal plans are calculated and assigned
to the agents. This alone is by no means an easy task. The disaggregate counterpiece of a
SUE implies that every agent considers a whole choice set of (possibly suboptimal) plans and
selects one of these plans probabilistically, which can lead to huge data structures. Section 3
gives examples of how to deal with these difficulties.
Summarizing, we have now arrived at a dynamic DTA specification that accounts for arbitrary
behavioral dimensions. Since the presentation was mostly intuitive, the introductory note on
the statistical meaning of a disaggregate simulation system should be recalled at this point: It
is possible to interpret the agent-based simulation as a Monte-Carlo solution procedure for a
probabilistic model of plan choice behavior. However, this specification is not given explicitly
but results rather implicitly in the agent-based approach from the interactions of the various
sub-models.
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3 Agent-based simulation
The conceptual validity of the agent-based traffic assignment model is fairly intuitive. How-
ever, since it comes with a substantial computational burden of solving the model, it brings
along entirely new challenges on the simulation side.
On the demand side, there is in particular the combinatorial number of choice alternatives that
needs to be accounted for. For example, random utility models rely on an a-priori enumeration
of a choice set that is representative for the options every single traveler considers when making
a choice [Ben-Akiva and Lerman, 1985]. This choice set is huge in the case of an agent-based
simulation [Bowman and Ben-Akiva, 1998]. While there are sampling-based approaches to
the modeling of large choice sets that aim at reducing this computational burden, they have
not yet been carried over to the modeling of all-day-plan choices [Ben-Akiva and Lerman,
1985, Frejinger et al., 2009].
As long as household interactions are not accounted for, the demand modeling problem can be
decomposed by agent once the network conditions are given, which is of great computational
advantage. The supply model, on the other hand, deals with congestion, which is by definition
a result of the physical interactions of all travelers. Modeling large urban areas requires to
deal with millions of travelers, and an operational supply simulation must hence be able to
load all of these travelers with reasonable computation time on the network.
The following sections describe how these problems can be resolved. The presentation draws
heavily from the design of the MATSim simulation system [Raney and Nagel, 2006, MATSIM
www page, accessed 2009], in which most of the the outlined procedures have been imple-
mented and tested.
3.1 Agent-based UE; one plan per traveler
The simulation of an agent-based UE is possible by the following implementation of the
behavioral elements.
Choice set generation: For every agent, generate what would have been best in the previous
iteration. This does not only concern the route, but all considered choice dimensions, e.g.,
departure times and/or mode choice.
Choice: Switch to the new plan with a certain probability.
The choice set generation implements a “best reply” dynamic. This now requires to identify
an optimal all-day plan for given network conditions. While the calculation of time-dependent
shortest paths for UE route assignment is computationally manageable, the identification of
optimal plans is far more difficult [Recker, 2001]. This constitutes an important technical
motivation to switch to an agent-based SUE, where optimality is not required (see below).
Even in the manageable cases of, e.g., shortest paths, any best reply computation is an
approximation. Time-dependent routing algorithms need to know every link’s travel time
as a function of the link entrance time. In computational practice, this information exists
only in some average and interpolated way. For that reason, such computations become more
robust if the performance of plans is directly taken from the network loading instead of relying
on the prediction of the best reply computation, and an agent sticks with a new plan only
if it performs better than its previous plan [Raney and Nagel, 2004]. However, in order to
keep the run times maneagable, in computational practice multiple agents need to make such
trial-and-error moves simultaneously. This is, therefore, not an exact best reply algorithm.
For the choice, a useful approach is to make the switching rate from the current to the best
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reply solution roughly proportional to the expected improvement. A possible approach is
P (old→ new) ∝ max[0, eβ (Snew−Sold) − 1] . (5)
where Snew and Sold are the (expected) scores of the new and the old plan, respectively.
(Section 3.2.4 gives an example of how a scoring function for all-day plans could look like.)
For a small difference between Sold and Snew, this can be linearly approximated by
eβ (Snew−Sold) − 1 ≈ β (Snew − Sold) , (6)
which essentially means that P (old→ new) is proportional to the magnitude of the improve-
ment. Note how the decreasing switching fraction of the continuous case is replaced by a
decreasing switching rate (= probability).
Clearly, any fixed point of such iterations is a UE since at the fixed point no switching
takes place, meaning that the best reply plan has the same score as the already existing
plan. The stability of the fixed point depends on the slope of the switching rate at the fixed
point, in the above formulation on the β: All other things equal, making β smaller makes
the fixed point more stable, but slows down convergence. These observations do not only
hold in transporation [e.g., Watling and Hazelton, 2003], but quite generally in the area of
“evolutionary games and dynamical systems” [Hofbauer and Sigmund, 1998]. In addition, in
the context of traffic assignment, the existence of physical queues that allows for spillback
across many links has been shown to be an apparently inevitable source of multiple Nash
equilibria [Daganzo, 1998].
Alternatively, some MSA (”method of sucessive averages”)-like scheme may be used [Liu
et al., 2007]. A disadvantage is that, with MSA, the switching rate does not depend on the
magnitude of the expected improvement, which possibly means slow(er) convergence. An
advantage of MSA is that one does not need to find out a good value for the proportionality
factor (β in the above example).
Yet another approach would be to use a “gap” function that measures the distance of the
current assignment from an equilibrium and to infer the switching rate from the requirement
that this function needs to be minimized [Lu et al., 2009, Zhang et al., 2008]. However, we
are not aware of any operational gap function that applies to all-day plans.
The major criticism of the agent-based UE is its lack of behavioral realism. In a UE, every
agent is assumed to react with a best response according to a model of its objectives, which
implies that real travelers are able to compute best responses despite of their combinatorial
nature and high dimension [Bowman and Ben-Akiva, 1998]. Furthermore, like for a pure route
assignment, it is reasonable to assume that (i) the behavioral objective is imperfectly modeled
and that (ii) explorative travel behavior leads to more or less random variations in what real
travelers do. While (ii) explicitly introduces stochasticity, (i) calls for it as a representation
of the imprecisions in the behavioral model.
These considerations do not only lead naturally to the agent-based SUE; they also motivate
an additional behavioral component that captures the explorative learning of real travelers.
Similarly to the symmetry between day-to-day replanning and the iterative solution of the
traffic assigment problem, an explorative learning algorithm can be motivated either as a
model of real learning or as a computational method to solve a stochastic assignment problem.
The following section presents a possible implementation of such an algorithm.
3.2 Agent-based SUE; multiple plans per traveler
In order to put the proposed method for the simulation of an agent-based SUE into a somewhat
broader perspective, the problem is phrased in terms of discrete choice theory [Ben-Akiva and
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Lerman, 1985].
Denote by Pn(i|Cn) the probability that agent n selects plan i from its choice set Cn of
available plans. The analyst’s possible uncertainty about the choice set motivates a stochastic
specification Pn(Cn) of this set. Combining these elements, one obtains the following choice
distribution per agent [Manski, 1977]:
Pn(i) =
∑
Cn
Pn(i|Cn)Pn(Cn). (7)
An evaluation of this model is computationally very challenging because the sum runs over
all possible subsets of the universal choice set. However, from a simulation perspective, it is
sufficient to generate draws from (7). This requires two steps: First, to draw a choice set
Cn for every agent n from Pn(Cn), and second to make draws from Pn(i|Cn) conditional on
these choice sets. An additional difficulty with this procedure are the interactions among the
agents through the network conditions, which do not only couple all choices but also require
to build all choice sets simultaneously.
A possible implementation is to approach every traveler’s daily planning problem as a population-
based search algorithm. Such a search algorithm maintains a collection (= population) of
possible solutions to a problem instance, and obtains better solutions via the evolution of
that collection. This is a typical machine-learning [e.g. Russel and Norvig, 1995] approach;
the best-known population-based search algorithms (also called evolutionary algorithms)
are genetic algorithms [e.g., Goldberg, 1989].
It is important to note that “population” here refers to the collection of solutions for a single
individual. There is also the population of travelers. Every individual uses a population-based
algorithm in order to “co-evolve” in the population of all travelers [also see Balmer, 2007].
A population-based search algorithm typically works as follows:
Algorithm 4 Population-based search
1. Initiation: Generate a collection of candidate solutions for a problem instance.
2. Iterations: Repeat the following many times.
(a) Scoring: Evaluate every candidate solution’s “score” or “fitness”.
(b) Selection: Decrease the occurences of “bad” solutions. There are many ways how
this can be done.
(c) Construction of new solutions: Construct new solutions and add them to the
collection of candidate solutions.
Regarding the construction of new solutions, two operators are often used in genetic algo-
rithms: Mutation – which takes a candidate solution and performs small modifications to it;
and crossover – which takes two candidate solutions and constructs a new one from those.
Since mutation takes one existing solution and crossover takes two, it makes sense to also
move in the opposite direction and define an operator that takes zero solutions as input, i.e.,
generates solutions from scratch – a “best-reply to last iteration” would, for example, be
such an operator.
For travel behavior, solutions correspond to plans. In the XML notation from Sec. 2.5, this
may look as follows:
<person id="321" age="25" income="60000" ... >
11
<plan score="123.4">
<activity type="home" location="123" endtime="07:23:45" ... />
<leg mode="car">
<route >...</route >
</leg >
<activity type="work" location="..." endtime="..." ... />
<leg mode="car">
<route >...</route >
</leg >
<activity type="shop" ... />
...
</plan >
<plan score="134.5">
...
</plan >
</person >
Congruent with what has been said before, we typically have a situation where multiple
travelers evolve simultaneously. That is, we have a population of persons where every person
has a population of plans. The result is a co-evolutionary dynamic, where every individual
person evolves according to a population-based co-evolutionary algorithm. The overall
approach reads as follows [see, e.g., Hraber et al., 1994, Arthur, 1994, for a similar approaches]:
Algorithm 5 Co-evolutionary, population-based search
1. Initiation: Generate at least one plan for every person.
2. Iterations: Repeat the following many times.
(a) Selection/Choice: Select, for every person, one of the plans.
(b) Scoring: Obtain a score for every person’s selected plan. This is done by executing
all selected plans simultaneously in a simulation, and attaching some performance
measure to each executed plan. Clearly, what was the network loading before
has now evolved to a full-fledged person-based simulation of daily activities. See
Sec. 3.2.4 for more detail on the scoring.
(c) Generation of new plans (innovation)/Choice set generation: For some of
the persons, generate new plans, for example as “best replies” or as mutations of
existing plans (e.g. small departure time changes).
Note that this approach is really quite congruent with the SUE approach: Every person has
a collection of plans, which may be interpreted as the choice set. As in SUE, the choice set
may be generated while the iterations run or before the iterations start. And every person
selects between the plans, where one can attach to every plan a score-based probability to
be selected, in the end similar to Eq. (3). Clearly, a relevant research topic in this regards
is to specify an evolutionary dynamic that can be shown to converge to choice sets that are
generated consistently with the requirements of discrete choice theory.
The following subsections give examples for the different elements of this approach.
3.2.1 Selection (choice)
A possible choice algorithm is the following: For persons with unscored plans, select an
unscored plan. For all other persons, select between existing plans with some SUE model,
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e.g. a logit model, i.e.,
P (i) =
eβSi∑
j e
βSj
(8)
where Si is the score of plan i and β models the travelers’ ability to distinguish between plans
of different scores.
In practice, we have found that it is much better to not use Eq. (8) directly, but rather use
a switching process that converges towards Eq. (8). This can, for example, be achieved by
using a switching probability from i to j of
T (i→ j) = γ eβ(Sj−Si)/2 , (9)
where i is the previous plan, j is a randomly selected plan from the same person, and γ is a
proportionality constant that needs to be small enough so that the expression is never larger
than one (since it denotes a probability). This works because the logit model (8) fulfills the
detailed balance condition
P (i)T (i→ j) = P (j)T (j → i) (10)
for these T (i→ j) [e.g., Ross, 2006].1
The “switching approach” has additional advantages, including the following:
• Eq. (9) can be behaviorally interpreted as the probability of switching from plan i to
plan j. Plausibly, this probability increases with the magnitude of the improvement.
For certain applications, one might desire a more involved approach, e.g., an expected
score of j which then initiates the switch.
• One could replace Eq. (9) by a threshold-based dynamics, i.e. a switch to a better
solution will only take place if the improvement is above a certain threshold. The dis-
advantage is that one loses some of the mathematical interpretation, but the advantage
is that it may be more consistent with some discussion in project appraisal where it is
said that small improvements may not lead to a change in behavior.
Although we have not done so systematically in past work, it is no problem to include formu-
lations such as path-size logit [Ben-Akiva and Bierlaire, 1999] into the choice probabilities.
3.2.2 Score convergence
The assumption that the scores eventually converge to some constant value intuitively means
that the scores cannot display spontaneous reactive behavior to a certain iteration. For
example, it might be possible that a particular iteration displays “network breakdown” [Rieser
and Nagel, 2008]. Converged scores would not trigger a next-day reaction to that breakdown.
In practice, this can be achieved by averaging the scores over many iterations, which bears
some similarity with ficticious play [Monderer and Shapley, 1996, Garcia et al., 2000]. Once
more, MSA is an option, with the same advantages and disadvantages as discussed before.
An alternative is to us a small learning rate α in
Snewi = (1− α)Soldi + α S˜i , (11)
1Assume that, after a number of iterations, there is no more innovation, i.e., the choice set for every agent
is fixed, and that the scores are updated by MSA. Upon convergence of the iterations, all agents draw their
plans from a fixed choice set based on constant score expectations, cf. (4). This means that all agents make
their choices independently (and that all interactions are captured in the scores). The switching logic (9) then
defines an ergodic Markovian process, which converges to the unique steady state probabilities (8).
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where Snewi and S
old
i are the agent’s memorized scores for option i, and S˜i is the most recent
actual performance with that option. The issue, in the end, is the same as with the stable-vs-
unstable fixed points: If the system is well-behaved (corresponding to a stable fixed point),
it will converge benignly to constant scores and thus to the detailed balance solution. If the
system is not well-behaved, one can still force it to such a solution with MSA, but the meaning
of this is less clear.
As stated before, stochastic network loading makes no additional conceptual difference, since
there is already stochasticity caused by the choice behavior.
3.2.3 Innovation (choice set generation)
So far, this has left open the question concerning the choice set generation, i.e., the part that
generates new plans or modifies existing ones.
One computationally simple technique that does not require a choice set enumeration is to
simulate randomly disturbed link costs and to run best response based on these costs. This,
however, can yield unrealistic results if one does not get the correlation structure of the noise
right.
An alternative is to calculate separate best responses after every network loading. Since
the process is stochastic, this will generate different solutions from iteration to iteration.
An advantage is that the correlations will be generated by the simulation – and are, thus,
presumably realistic. A disadvantage is that there is currently little or no understanding how
this relates to the noise specifications in random utility modeling.
Beyond that, there is really a myriad of different algorithms that could be used here. Besides
the earlier-mentioned “mutation” [Balmer et al., 2005] or “crossover” [Charypar and Nagel,
2005, Meister et al., 2006], there are also many possibilities for constructive algorihms, such
as “agent-based” construction [Zhu et al., 2008]. One attractive option, clearly, is to use a
regular activity-based demand generation code [e.g., Bowman et al., 1998, Miller and Roorda,
2003] although our experience is that this may not be as simple as it seems [Rieser et al.,
2007] since in practice activity-based models are often constructed with OD matrices in mind.
3.2.4 Adjusting the “improvement function” from shortest time to generalized utility functions
This paper takes the inductive approach of arguing that one can make the network assignment
loop more general by including additional choice dimensions beyond routing. Clearly, for this
to work the computation of the scoring needs to take the effects of these additional choice
dimensions into account [also see Balmer, 2007]. Given evolutionary game theory, it is quite
obvious how to do that: One has to extend the cost function that is used for routing to a
general scoring function for complete daily plans.
That is, the performance of a daily plan needs to be scored. An established method to
estimate scoring functions for different alternatives is random utility theory [e.g. Ben-Akiva
and Lerman, 1985], which is why in the following, “scoring” will be replaced by “utility”. For
a utility function for daily plans, the following arguments may serve as starting points:
• A heuristic approach, consistent with wide-spread assumptions about travel behavior,
is to give positive rewards to performing an activity and negative rewards to travelling.
• For the activities, one should select functions where the marginal reward of doing an
activity decreases over time.
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• Without additional effects, such as opening times or time-varying congestion, the marginal
utilities of all performed activities should be the same.
MATSim has, in the past years, gained some experience with the approach described in the
following paragraphs.
Total utility The total score of a plan is computed as the sum of individual contributions:
Utotal =
m∑
i=1
Uperf ,i +
m∑
i=1
Ulate,i +
m∑
i=1
Utr ,i , (12)
where Utotal is the total utility for a given plan; m is the number of activities, which equals
the number of trips (the first and the last activity—both of the same type and at the same
location—are counted as one); Uperf ,i is the (positive) utility earned for performing activity i;
Ulate,i is the (negative) utility earned for arriving late to activity i; and Utr ,i is the (negative)
utility earned for traveling during trip i.
Utility of performing an activity A logarithmic form is used for the positive utility earned by
performing an activity:
Uperf ,i(tperf ,i) = βperf · t∗,i · ln
(
tperf ,i
t0,i
)
(13)
where tperf is the actual performed duration of the activity, t∗ is the “typical” duration of an
activity, and βperf is the marginal utility of an activity at its typical duration:
U ′perf ,i(x)|x=t∗,i = βperf · t∗,i ·
1
x
∣∣∣
x=t∗,i
= βperf . (14)
βperf is the same for all activities since in equilibrium all activities at their typical duration
need to have the same marginal utility.
At this point, both βperf and t∗,i are fixed because they are effectively only one free parameter
which is split into its two components in order to simplify the interpretation.
t0,i is a scaling parameter. Since ln(tperf/t0) = ln(tperf ) − ln(t0), its effect is that of shifting
the curve up and down, and thus determining when it crosses the zero line. Although inter-
pretations for this come to mind (such as a minimum duration of an activity, below which
it should not be performed), we have found that this does not work well in practice. The
practical problem is that one needs to control the curvature, i.e. the second derivative, at the
typical duration, because it is the change of the marginal utility that determines the slack
of an activity when the dayplan comes under pressure. The second derivative at the typical
duration is:
U ′′perf,i(x)|x=t∗,i = βperf · t∗,i ·
−1
x2
∣∣∣
x=t∗,i
= −βperf
t∗,i
. (15)
Since both βperf and t∗,i are already fix, it turns out that, with Eq. (13), one cannot separately
control the curvature at the typical duration. At the same time, the remaining free parameter,
t0,i, controls aspects that seem comparatively less important.
Overall, a better form of the utility function needs to be found, with a functional form that
minimally allows to control the first and second derivative at the typical duration. See, e.g.,
work by Joh [Joh et al., 2003] or by Feil [Feil et al., 2009], although we have not yet detected
direct control over the second derivative in these works.
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Disutility of traveling The (dis)utility of traveling is uniformly assumed as:
Utr ,i = βtr · ttr,i , (16)
where βtr is the marginal utility (in Euro/h) for travel, and ttr,i is the number of hours spent
traveling during trip i. βtr is usually negative. Clearly, it is no problem to use other forms.
Disutility of schedule delay The (dis)utility of being late is uniformly assumed as:
Ulate,i = βlate · tlate,i , (17)
where βlate is the marginal utility (in Euro/h) for being late, and tlate,i is the number of hours
late to activity i. βlate is usually negative. Once more, clearly it is no problem to use other
forms.
In principle, arriving early or leaving early could also be punished. There is, however, no
immediate need to punish early arrival, since waiting times are already indirectly punished
by foregoing the reward that could be accumulated by doing an activity instead (opportunity
cost of time). In consequence, the effective (dis)utility of waiting is already −βperf t∗,i/tperf ,i ≈
−βperf . Similarly, that opportunity cost has to be added to the time spent traveling, arriving
at an effective (dis)utility of traveling of βtr − βperf t∗,i/tperf ,i ≈ βtr − βperf , where, again, βtr
typically is negative.
No opportunity cost needs to be added to late arrivals, because the late arrival time is spent
somewhere else. In consequence, the effective (dis)utility of arriving late remains at βlate . –
These values, βperf , βperf − βtr, and −βlate , are the values that correspond to the parameters
of the Vickrey model [Arnott et al., 1990].
3.3 Network modeling
As stated in the introduction, including additional choice dimenensions into the iterations has
much to gain if this leads to additional consistency. This implies that a “behavioral” network
loading model should not just take trips from a time-dependent OD matrix but should rather
model the complete execution of a plan such as in Sec. 3.2.
For this, the behavioral network model needs to be microscopic, i.e., it should follow every
individual agent and every individual vehicle. In addition, it should maintain the integrity of
those entities, i.e., agents should only be able to depart from an activity if they are actually
there (i.e., after they have shown up), and vehicles should only be able to depart from a
location if they are actually there. In addition, the feedback from the network loading should
be microscopic, i.e., for every agent and every vehicle there should be a trace of their actions.
In practice, it has turned out that using so-called events is a good means of transmitting such
performance information. For the plan in Sec. 3.2, events may include the following (again
using XML as a language):
<event type="endAct" time="07:23:45" personId="321" .../>
<event type="departure" mode="car" time="07:23:45" vehId="..." ... />
<event type="lvLink" time="..." vehId="..." .../>
<event type="enterLink" time="..." ... />
...
<event type="arrival" time="..." ... />
<event type="beginAct" actType="work" time="..." ... />
This is an elegant method to couple the network loading module with other modules [see, e.g.
Ferber, 1999, Naumov, 2006, Mast et al., 2009].
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Note that the term “microscopic” refers to the resolution of the model (every synthetic
traveler is individually resolved), while at the same time the fidelity of the model can be
very much reduced. The fastest implementations use simple store-and-forward mechanisms
for their links [Sima˜o and Powell, 1992, Gawron, 1998a,b, Bottom, 2000]. Although simple,
such models obey, per link, flow capacity limits, speed limits, and storage limits. Since flow
capacity and storage limits together cause spillback, such models are able to model physical
queues. The speed of the backwards traveling kinematic congestion wave is too fast compared
to reality [Simon and Nagel, 1999], but this can be corrected [Charypar, 2008]. The approach
can be implemented in parallel [Cetin et al., 2003], in an event-driven way [Charypar et al.,
2007a], and those two approaches can be combined [Charypar et al., 2007b]. Even without
parallelization, this can be set up so that a full day of all of Switzerland (8 million inhabitants)
can be simulated in about 1.5 hours [Waraich et al., 2009]; with parallel hardware, linear
speed-up can be achieved [Cetin et al., 2003, Charypar et al., 2007b], dividing the runtime by
the number of available CPUs.
4 Behavioral calibration
When going from aggregate OD matrices to individual agents, one also goes from smooth equa-
tions to stochastic, often rule-based systems. This complicates the mathematical perspective
on the model, which arguably is a major reason for the ongoing success of the behaviorally
simple yet mathematically tractable traditional assignment procedures. However, although
the mathematics of iterated DTA simulations are different, they are not impossible to do
Nagel et al. [1998].
Take for example the calibration of the demand. Traditionally, the four-step model would
generate an OD matrix, which then is calibrated from traffic counts by approximate yet
statistically motivated techniques [e.g., Cascetta and Nguyen, 1988, Cascetta et al., 1993, Ben-
Akiva et al., 1998]. Even disaggregate DTA simulations such as DynaMIT or DYNASMART
aggregate their individual-level demand representation into OD matrices before adjusting
it to available traffic counts [Ashok, 1996, Antoniou, 2004, Zhou, 2004]. This, however, is
not necessary if one carries over the mathematics of the calibration to a fully disaggregate
perspective, which we demonstrate in this section.2
Consider the familiar problem of estimating path flows (i.e., trips) between a set of OD pairs
from traffic counts [Bell et al., 1997, 1996, Sherali et al., 1994, 2003, Nie and Lee, 2002, Nie
et al., 2005]. It typically is solved by the minimization of some distance measure between
simulated volumes and measured traffic counts, where additional assumptions (typically a
prior OD matrix) are necessary in order to resolve the ubiquitous underdetermination of the
problem. In order to carry these techniques over to the calibration of an agent-based demand,
one essentially needs to resolve three problems, the first two of which have both been addressed
in earlier parts of this article:
1. Agent-based demand calibration deals with all-day plans, not with separate trips. →
Going formally from trips to plans is straightforward if one considers plans as generalized
paths on a time-expanded network.
2. Agents are integer entities and no continues streams. → Relating integer agents and
continuous commodity streams requires to (i) consider every agent as a single commodity
2As stated in the introduction, random utility modeling went through a similar development, going from
closed-form models with fairly specific assumptions to simulation-based models with a substantially wider
scope.
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and to (ii) observe many realizations of the agent behavior in order to again obtain a
continous limit of the behavior.
3. What is the agent-based counterpiece of a prior OD matrix? → One needs to observe
that agent-based simulation is possible even without any traffic counts. In a Bayesian
framework, the simulation system alone provides a complete behavioral prior, which
then is updated based on the traffic counts.
It is possible to walk formally through these observations and to end up with an operational
formulation of the agent-based demand calibration problem [Flo¨ttero¨d, 2008, 2009]:
Assume that, in a given iteration of the simulation, agent n faces the problem of drawing
a plan i from its plan choice set, and assume that this choice behavior follows some choice
distribution Pn(i), which may be given either explicitly or through a procedural decision
protocol. Now there is a set y of traffic counts that are obtained on arbitrary links and at
arbitrary times in the network. In a Bayesian sense, this information can be added to the
agent’s behavior by specifying its posterior choice distribution
Pn(i|y) ∼ p(y|i)Pn(i) (18)
where p(y|i) is the likelihood of the measurements y given that the agent chooses plan i.
More generally, one can state the agent-based calibration problem as the problem of making
all agents in the population draw jointly from their behavioral posteriors instead of their
priors, which are already implemented in the plain simulation.
Although this problem can be tackled in some generality, we present, only for illustration, a
specific solution that relies on the following assumptions:
• The plan choice model is multinomial logit.
• The traffic counts are independently normally distributed.
• The network is only lightly congested.3
In this case, it is possible to arrive at the following solution to the problem:
Pn(i|y) ∼ exp
(
Vn(i) +
∑
at∈i
ya(t)− q¯a(t)
σ2a(t)
)
. (19)
where Vn(i) is the systematic utility agent n assigns to plan i, at ∈ i indicates that plan i
implies to cross the sensor on link a in time step t, ya(t) is the measured traffic count on link
a in time step t, q¯a(t) is the average simulated volume on link a in time step t, and σ2a(t) is
the variance of the normal likelihood of the respective measurement.
Intuitively, this algorithm works like a controller that steers the agents towards a reasonable
fulfillment of the measurements: For any sensor-equipped link, the utility addend is positive
if the measured flow is higher than the simulated flow such that the utility of plans that cross
this link is increased. Vice versa, if the measured flow is lower than the simulated flow, the
according utility addend is negative such that plans that cross this link are penalized.
This approach has proven very powerful in practice, and first results for a large real-world
application are available [Flo¨ttero¨d et al., 2009]. That is, the agent-based approach has caught
3 This assumption allows to treat the network loading as a linear mapping. In congested conditions, a more
involved linearization of the network loading is necessary. However, this can be realized in a computationally
very efficient way [Flo¨ttero¨d and Bierlaire, 2009].
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up with the traditional assignment procedures with respect to the calibration of the demand,
and the methodological progress that made this possible is likely to carry over to other fields
where, up to now, traditional methods had an edge over microsimulations because of their
better understood mathematics.
5 Within-day replanning
Up to this point, only equilibrium models were considered, where every traveler is essentially
assumed to have full and predictive information about the network conditions from many
previous days of experience. The iterative fixed point solution procedure for the calculation
of such an equilibrium clearly can be regarded as an explicit implementation of this learning
procedure, although it can be equally motivated from a purely computational point of view.
Equilibrium models apply on large time scales to stable transportation systems, but they
are inadequate to capture any transients in the system’s day-to-day dynamics that result
from the learning process of not yet well-informed travelers that only in the limit leads to
the postulated equilibrium. Another important aspect of these transients is that travelers
encounter situations that are different from what they expect, which can trigger spontaneous
replanning within a given day.
From a modeling perspective, within-day replanning is a relatively recent field. Structurally,
it does not differ from any other demand model, only that the choices are conditioned on
attributes of the situation that do not necessarily reflect that situation but rather the traveler’s
belief abut it. This, however, implies that the replanning process and the whole-day network
loading of an assignment are now intertwined.
5.1 Day-to-day vs. within-day models
The two most important temporal dimensions in DTA are within-day dynamics and day-to-
day dynamics. Within-day dynamics refer to the temporal variability of demand and network
conditions for a given day. Day-to-day dynamics capture the evolution of the system over
many days. Doubly-dynamic models capture both aspects in one model.
The vast majority of within-day dynamic assignment models constrain themselves to traffic
flow dynamics but do not account for within-day replanning. This is reasonable for a stable
transportation system in which all travelers experience more or less what they have expected
when planning their trips a priori. If, however, there are unforseeable events, then there will
be within-day replanning that needs to be modeled.
The defining element of day-to-day dynamics is the day-to-day replanning of travelers,
which is driven by a learning process of exploring the transportation system day by day,
collecting information, and (re)considering travel decisions based on this information. Day-
to-day models are not specific to DTA and can also be linked with static network models that
go without within-day dynamics [Cascetta, 2001, 1989]. For day-to-day models, the notion of
an equilibrium needs to be replaced by that of a limiting system behavior after a large number
of days, which corresponds to a stationary distribution in case of stochastic dynamics or to a
fixed point if the system is deterministic and well-behaved [Watling and Hazelton, 2003].
A doubly-dynamic assignment combines a day-to-day replanning logic with a dynamic
within-day network model, but it does not necessarily capture within-day replanning [Bali-
jepalli et al., 2007, Cascetta and Cantarella, 1991].
A doubly-dynamic replanning model is one where the replanning itself does not only
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happen on a day-to-day basis but also within-day. This type of model has received little
attention in the literature, arguably because it calls for substantial modeling efforts. However,
considering that one main advantage of day-to-day assignment models is their ability to
model transients in the network evolution during which travelers are imperfectly informed,
it is plausible to assume that this imperfect information also implies that travelers replan
spontaneously based on en-trip gathered information.
5.2 Inserting the within-day replanning into the day-to-day assignment
Within-day replanning requires to specify the initial information an agent posesses when
starting its day. Adopting a black & white perspective on the problem this can either be
information about the expected network conditions or a set of alternative plans for the given
day.
Replanning only based on expected network conditions is computationally convenient because
of the relatively small amount of information that needs to be stored per agent (and, in
addition, this information could be shared by more than one agent). Replanning only in
terms of the selection of a priori specified plans suffers from the need to define the plans such
that they overlap at well-defined switching points, which may be numerous and hence call for
a large number of plans.
A more general perspective would be to steer the within-day replanning by a strategy [Ax-
hausen, 1988, 1990], which would be defined in terms of a mapping of network conditions on
(to be) executed plans. This comprises the previous approaches in that both expected network
conditions and a priori generated choice sets constitute parameterizations of this strategy.
Whatever the strategy, the result of a simulated day are the executed plan of every traveler,
the experienced network conditions, and some assessment of the plan’s performance. This is
exactly the information that needs to be fed into the learning model of a day-to-day replanning
system. The day-to-day replanning model, however, now needs to be generalized into a model
that defines a strategy for the next day. The arguably simplest approach would be here to
keep the decision protocol of the strategy fixed over the days and to update only the expected
network conditions on which it is based.
5.3 Direct simulation
Computationally, a direct simulation of within-day replanning itself, is, at least structurally,
less involved than an equilibrium model. The reason is that it can be solved forwards through
simulated time, which is straightforward to implement at least in principle.
A corresponding, naive implementation in a time-stepped simulation would be to not only
go through all network elements during a time step, but also through all simulated travelers,
to compute their perceptions based on the information that they receive (own observations,
radio broadcast, specific messages), and from that to compute their decisions.
In addition, if one attaches the behavioral algorithms directly to the agent, this becomes
rather easy to parallelize and in consequence may run extremely fast. The disadvantage
would be less modularity of software design, and possible effects of so-called race conditions,
where different program threads run at different speeds depending on the state of the parallel
computer, e.g., by loads from other processes.
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5.4 Emulating within-day replanning by iterative simulation
Despite of the stronger coupling between network loading and within-day replanning, the
model can still be solved in an iterative manner that is consistent with the fixed point simula-
tion approach for the equilibrium model considered so far. It still is possible to iterate between
a demand simulator and a supply simulator in a setting where every agent chooses a whole
plan before the network loading, and where the whole plan is executed without replanning
during the network loading.
The difference between an equilbrium model and a within-day model is that an equilibrium
demand model can utilize all information from the most recent network loading(s), whereas a
within-day demand model generates every elementary decision of a plan only based on such
information that could have actually been gathered up to the according point in simulated
time. That is, when an agent replans in the iterative within-day demand model, it still
builds its plan incrementally along the time axis, where the information on which it bases its
elementary decisions is “revealed” as time increases.
An important plus of the iterative solution is that it re-establishes the separation of replanning
and network loading, which helps to deal with the simulation system as a whole. For example,
an operational solution to the self-consistent route guidance problem, which only makes sense
in non-equilbrium conditions, is only available for an indirect formulation of the within-day
replanning problem [Bottom, 2000, Bottom et al., 1999]. Similarly, the real-time tracking
of travel behavior from traffic counts is enabled by an iterative solution of the within-day
assignment model [Flo¨ttero¨d, 2008].
6 Conclusion
This paper investigates how behavioral considerations can be integrated into the modeling
of network dynamics. Starting from regular route assignment, the paper points out that one
can extend the iterative solution procedure of static or dynamic traffic assignment to include
additional behavioral dimensions such as time adaptation, mode choice or secondary activity
location choice. This is somewhat similar to the so-called supernetworks approach, but argues
from the viewpoint of the iterative solution procedure rather than from the viewpoint of the
problem definition.
In order to address the combinatorial explosion of the commodities caused by the expansion of
the choice dimensions, it is suggested to move to individual particles. This allows an interpre-
tation of the solution procedure as behavioral day-to-day learning, but maintains a connection
to the SUE definition by interpreting the synthetic travellers’ behavior as random draws from
individual choice sets. In that latter interpretation, the iterative solution procedure becomes
a Monte Carlo simulation that samples from the population’s choice distribution.
A major part of the paper discusses simulation/computer implementation issues. From the
definition given above, progress can be made by using methods from machine learning and
co-evolutionary search algorithms. The SUE problem of random selection between different
alternatives can be cast as a so-called population-based optimization algorithm where every
synthetic traveler randomly selects between the different members of the population of possible
solutions. At the same time, the population of the travelers co-evolves towards a stationary
distribution of choices.
A separate section discusses how such an approach can be calibrated to real-world measure-
ments in the same way as this is possible with calibration procedures in more conventional
assignment. It turns out that it is possible to use a Bayesian interpretation of the choice
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behavior in order to systematically modify the choices of the simulated agents according to
the measurements.
Overall, it has been clear for some time now that it is possible to simulate large transportation
systems microscopically, including many learning iterations with choice dimensions beyond
route choice, and this paper describes some of the necessary methods and techniques. Future
research will have to fill the gap between the computationally efficient yet behaviorally sim-
plified approaches that have by now been demonstrated to be applicable to large real-world
scenarios and the far more sophisticated yet less operational behavioral models proposed in
the travel demand literature.
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